How Ukraine's Drone Swarm Upended Russia's Air Force and Reshaped Global Defense Strategies

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“Cheap drones destroyed a significant fraction of Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber force” a phrase that would have been the stuff of science fiction even a few years ago, but which now constitutes the reportage of the consequences of Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web, a targeted drone campaign that has redrawn the limits of asymmetric conflict and revealed weaknesses in even the most protected military stockpiles.

On June 1, 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) coordinated a highly sophisticated attack, hitting four of Russia’s most vital air bases, Olenya, Diaghilev, Belaya, and Ivanovo, spread over thousands of kilometres and three time zones. With 117 tiny, first-person-view (FPV) drones, secretly smuggled into Russia over 18 months and released from hidden cargo trucks, Ukrainian agents hit Russia at its strategic aviation core. The SBU claimed that over 40 aircraft, including Tu-95MS Bears, Tu-22M3 Backfires, Tu-160 Blackjacks, and A-50 airborne early warning planes, were damaged or destroyed, representing up to 34% of Russia’s cruise missile bomber fleet and an estimated $7 billion in losses (cheap drones destroyed a significant fraction of Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber force; caused more than $7 billion worth of financial damage).

The technological prowess of Spider Web is as impressive as its strategic consequence. The use of drones with FPV technology and Russian mobile networks for remote piloting with onboard artificial intelligence was a masterstroke. As per the SBU, “During the operation, modern UAV control technology was used, which combines autonomous artificial intelligence algorithms and manual operator intervention.” Upon loss of signal, “some drones lost signal and switched to performing a mission using artificial intelligence along a preplanned route. After approaching and contacting a specifically designated target, the warhead was automatically activated” (SBU statement). This combined approach permitted the accurate destruction of vulnerable aircraft targets engines, wings, antennas at hitherto inviolable bases, like Belaya in Siberia, more than 4,000 kilometers from Ukraine (Belaya air base was hitherto believed to be safely out of range of Ukrainian attacks).

The consequences for Russia’s airpower are profound. The Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers, long since out of production during the Soviet era, cannot be quickly replaced. Russia’s newest generation strategic bomber, the Tu-160, is being manufactured at a snail’s pace only two new planes since 2022. The loss of even a handful of bombers is not only a financial setback but a significant weakening of Russia’s capability to conduct cruise missile strikes and sustain its nuclear deterrent. “None of these aircraft can be replaced quickly, and most of them cannot be replaced at all since the production capabilities have long ceased to exist,” says Russian aerospace commentator Piotr Butowski (most of them cannot be replaced because the production lines do not exist anymore).

The psychological and doctrinal effect of the operation could be even higher. For decades, planners had counted on rear-area bases the hundreds or thousands of miles behind the front lines serving as sanctuaries for strategic assets. Operation Spider Web “tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe,” presenting an replicable model for smaller militaries to attack larger foes by targeting deep, high-value targets with seas of cheap drones (broke the old notion that bases way in the back of the front lines are safe). The economic imbalance is stark: a $3,000 drone can shoot down a $250 million bomber.

Russia’s initial reaction has been subdued, officials admitting to some losses but playing down their extent. Still, the strategic shock is palpable. Defending any remaining bombers now means dispersal, building hardened bunkers, and air-defence redeployment steps that sap resources and curtail operational flexibility (Shielding bases from follow-up attacks will involve building earthen revetments, emplacing radar-guided 30 mm cannons and electronic-warfare jammers). The destruction of the precious A-50 AWACS aircraft further reduces Russia’s capability to coordinate aerial operations and counter future attacks.

Ukraine’s ability to mount such operations is rooted in its rapidly expanding domestic drone industry, which produced nearly 2 million drones in 2024. These advances are not just technological but organizational: the operation relied on clandestine logistics, deception, and local Russian truck drivers unwittingly delivering disguised launch platforms to pre-surveyed sites (the SSU reportedly recruited Russian truck drivers to deliver the mobile drone launchers camouflaged as standard cargo loads). The success of the attack underscores the way “low-cost unmanned systems have allowed Ukraine to employ novel doctrines for special operations,” CSIS analysts note (low-cost unmanned systems have enabled Ukraine to utilize innovative doctrines).

At home, morale lift from Spider Web is tangible but tempered by fatigue. With three years of war behind them, Ukrainians are fatigued, but surveys indicate a resolute refusal to surrender. “Exhaustion in Ukraine is very real,” according to Volodymyr Dubovyk, Odesa Mechnikov National University professor. But simultaneously, people have no appetite for surrender and capitulation, because, after all, already so much being lost, already so many lives lost why? Then to give Russia what it desired from the start? That makes sense for many Ukrainians (Volodymyr Dubovyk, The Hill). Even while public opinion is turning towards negotiation, the majority are still not willing to accept Russia’s insistence on territorial loss or military limitations (levels of support for negotiated peace increasing to 52%).

But the future of Ukraine’s defense remains uncertain amidst uncertainty regarding U.S. support. Neither has President Trump condemned nor endorsed the cross-border operation, but his government’s suspension of new packages of aid and pressure for a ceasefire has put Kyiv and its European allies in a flurry. Though U.S. military aid already approved still flows in, it is limited, and Europe’s ability to bridge the gap is restricted. Europe has had many reasons to fear the loss of American support for Ukraine and doubt the transatlantic alliance more broadly, Samuel Johnson-Saeger and Hilary Appel write (Europe has had numerous reasons to worry about losing American backing). European governments have committed new assistance and stepped up defense manufacturing, but essential gaps persist in air defense, long-range strike, and intelligence.

Ukraine’s internal defense production has skyrocketed, making 30% of its own weapons, such as drones and guns, but is still reliant on overseas parts and susceptible to Russian bombings of factories (Ukraine now makes 30 percent of the nation’s weapons internally). Apart from U.S. intelligence and logistics, Ukraine’s capacity for precision strikes and maintaining its military campaign would severely be impaired.

The coordinated attack on the Kerch Bridge, another piece of covert engineering that included 1,100 kilograms of waterborne explosives, further demonstrates Ukraine’s growing ability for deep, disruptive hits against Russian infrastructure (mined underwater piers with 1,100 kilograms of high explosives). The bridge, a symbol of Russian dominance of Crimea and a strategic supply line, was heavily damaged, compelling Moscow to impose restrictions and reassess its logistical security.

As Ukraine’s defenders and civilians alike grapple with the aftershocks of Spider Web, the course of the war remains profoundly uncertain. The campaign has revealed new fault lines in military doctrine, alliance politics, and the distribution of power globally. The era of the “air littoral” in which inexpensive drones can challenge even the most defended assets is here, and with it a new era in the science and engineering of war.