[Column] Korea's Increased Role Could Resolve U.S. Troop Dilemma

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One of the biggest dilemmas that South Korea’s new administration faces after it took office on Wednesday has to do with US Forces Korea, or USFK.

The demands coming from in and around the Donald Trump administration in the US recently fall largely into three categories.

One of them involves increasing expenditures toward the US’ defense of South Korea, including a larger share of defense costs for Seoul. This has long been one of Trump’s pet projects.

A second involves reducing the scale of US troops stationed in the country. In connection with this, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that the Trump administration was mulling plans to relocate 4,500 of the 28,500 troops currently with USFK to other areas of the Indo-Pacific regions, including Guam.

A third has to do with changing USFK’s role. The US has been consistently pursuing greater strategic flexibility for its troops in Korea since the early 2000s, and the matter has drawn renewed attention with recent remarks by USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, who commented that South Korea “looks like an island or like a fixed aircraft carrier floating in the water between Japan and mainland China.”

But a reduction of USFK’s scale and transformation of its role are not mutually compatible. This is evident from the differences of opinion we see in the US.

Some, including Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, have concluded that the better approach to effectively contain China would be to downscale USFK and relocate troops to locations such as Guam. Brunson, in contrast, maintains that it would be more effective in terms of containing China to maintain and reinforce the existing USFK presence that is closest to it.

“By being forward-stationed, we effectively operate inside an adversary’s anti-access/area denial bubble,” he commented, stressing that the US was operating within Beijing’s psychological space. In effect, the commander was emphasizing USFK’s role in containing China as a way of brushing aside discussions on troop reductions.

We will need to see the new National Defense Strategy — the writing of which is being directed by Colby — to see how these differences in the US end up being reconciled. But there is one point we should pay attention to: while the methods may differ, the growing consensus in the US is that Washington’s key strategy should be focused on China, and on preparing for a cross-strait conflict in particular. Any change in the nature of USFK, be it a reduction, retention, or reinforcement of the present scale, is very likely to be in that context.

This suggests that in its dealings with the new government in South Korea, the Trump administration is likely not only to demand an increase in Korea’s share of defense costs but also to pressure it into making a choice by raising the prospects of both a reduction in USFK’s scale and a redefinition of its role.

For Seoul, this will pose a major dilemma.

Agreeing to strategic flexibility raises the risk of getting pulled into unwanted warfare. It also creates a major stumbling block to restoring relations between Seoul and Beijing after their precipitous decline under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Conversely, if the US pushes for troop reductions, this will end up being used as a weapon in partisan conflict, cited as evidence of a “security vacuum” and used by conservatives to assign blame to the South Korean administration.

At times like this, it is crucial to make determinations that focus on the national interest. While we might regard it as preferable to maintain the status quo in terms of USFK’s scale, role, and cost to the South Korean government, this may be realistically unfeasible.

In that sense, I think we are better off preparing ourselves for a reduction in USFK’s scale. This is because it would be immensely harmful to South Korea’s national interest to accept a larger share of defense costs and a redefined role for USFK in the interest of preventing troop reductions.

At the same time, our thinking and perspective should also be oriented toward a “bigger” South Korea.

To date, South Korea has been confined by the US’ agenda. The main reason that every US administration in the 21st century has pursued strategic flexibility is to ensure the option of deploying USFK in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. South Korea has been in the position of wrestling with whether to recognize it or not.

The more South Korea lets itself get caught in the parameters dictated by the US, the fewer options it has for resolving its dilemma. There are two things we need to realize: one is that attempts to redefine USFK’s role are part of the US strategy to hem China in, and the other is that South Korea is poised to face a major crisis in the event of an emergency in Taiwan, even if the exact impact will depend on whether USFK troops are deployed and at what level.

In this response, the question of a “bigger” South Korea will require larger serious and intense discussions with the US and the rest of the international community as to what approach is best for promoting stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait and throughout East Asia.

The approach the US has pursued with its allies to date — and will continue to pursue — is one focused chiefly on deterring China through armament and reinforcement of its alliances. The aim of deterrence is to prevent Beijing from attempting an armed reunification with Taiwan by making it aware of the price it will pay if it does.

But that approach has more adverse effects than positive ones. Beijing has often assumed an even more militant stance, viewing this as having the aim of encouraging Taiwanese independence. In addition to routinely engaging in shows of force for Taiwan’s benefit, it also threatens outside parties with major consequences for intervention.

As a result, the intensifying arms race and military tensions have continued to drive up the Taiwan Strait’s crisis index. On the one hand, it leads to a waste of precious resources that should be used to improve livelihoods and respond to climate change. On the other, it raises the danger of unintended clashes and escalation.

The time has come to escape this vicious cycle. South Korea needs to seek out new roles at both the government and civilian levels. This is especially true at a time when many around the world have been voicing warnings and concerns about the future of the Taiwan Strait, yet no real alternative approaches have been observed.

One option we have is to consider different matters that we can raise for discussion with the international community as a country in East Asia. What I would prescribe is an approach of sharing our fears.

The situation of the mounting crisis in the Taiwan Strait is the product of one-sided fears. These fears serve as a basis for ratcheting up hostile rhetoric and reinforcing military postures based on the perception of another party as a threat.

But fear is a game with multiple players. When one side’s fears get expressed as antagonism, the other side tends to respond to that as a hostile act.

In contrast, shared fears can serve as a foundation for understanding and solidarity. Once we realize that the other side is scared just like us, that increases the possibility of communication and the virtue of moderation.

In that sense, we should be elevating the sharing of fears into the status of a discourse of resistance against the “alliance chain.”

If a cross-strait conflict breaks out for whatever reason and the US gets involved, that scenario has the potential to spread throughout East Asia through different parties bound by a chain of alliances, much like in the case of World War I. It would raise the possibility of intervention and involvement by US allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia and the Philippines on the one side, and Chinese allies — North Korea and its ally Russia — on the other.

This terrible scenario tells us that we need to rewrite the equation of fear. Such implications were found during the Cold War as well. The US and the Soviet Union were drunk on competition and caught up in an arms race. The two nations were able to reach various arms control and reduction agreements and ultimately end the Cold War because they shared an understanding that nuclear war would lead to everyone’s destruction.

It’s not enough to simply think that South Korea is a third party in cross-strait relations and therefore shouldn’t get involved. The idea that South Korea is a US ally and therefore should help the US is incredibly dangerous. This is why we need to speak up to change the hostile and unstable status quo into a peaceful and stable status quo.

We need to propose finding measures to lead to military and strategic peace through arms controls and trust-building. Becoming aware of our fears and sharing them could be the starting point.

By Cheong Wook-Sik, director of the Single SparklePeace Institute and director of the Peace Network

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